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AND A LITTLE CHILD SHALL LEAD
THEM:* NEW YORK'S ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL ACT OF 1986
By STEVEN L. KESSLER**
Behold, a legislature shall be with child, and shall bring forth a
son, and they shall call his name Baby RICO, which being inter-
preted is, Protector over the State.
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")' to combat the influence
of organized crime in interstate and foreign commerce.2 And it was
good. The Department of Justice was filing criminal indictments
against a carefully selected few thought to be members of reputed
organized crime families. Only a handful of cases were being filed
by parties other than the Government. And only "true racke-
teers"-those portrayed in old George Raft movies-were being la-
beled RICO "racketeers." And it was still good.
Then it happened. RICO started working its way into publica-
tions read by people whose only prior knowledge of RICO came
from Edward G. Robinson's masterful performance in Mervyn Le-
roy's 1930 classic Little Caesar.3 The Wall Street Journal and the
© 1990 by Steven L. Kessler. All Rights Reserved.
* Isaiah 11:6.
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I Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
2See J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CniL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY (1989
& Supp. 1990) (detailed discussion and analysis of RICO).
' "Mother of Mercy, is this the end of Rico?" gasped Edward G. Robinson (playing the
part of Rico), referring to his own imminent death, as the curtain came down in the final
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New York Times ran editorials and front page news articles on the
demise of civilization under RICO. Politicians called upon Con-
gress to expunge the statute or at least change it so it would not
stigmatize the "innocent," those individuals who were caught up in
what was called "white collar" criminal activity but who were not
really "racketeers." After all, they said, the new wave of defend-
ants under RICO were not "racketeers." Rather, they were people
more like, well, us.
And so RICO became the rage. Misunderstood even by some
of its drafters, RICO was kept intact by Congress despite ferocious
and intense pressure swelling in response to the Princeton/New-
port Partners and Drexel Burnham prosecutions. In the shadow of
their distant federal cousin, many states adopted a version of
RICO for local prosecutions.4 But, unlike Congress and most other
state legislatures, New York waited before drafting its organized
crime statute. New York's legislators chose to sift through more
than fifteen years of RICO history and select what they perceived
as the better parts of RICO before embarking on their own journey
into the land of organized crime.
In the summer of 1986, after five years of drafting and refining
bills in the state Assembly5 and state Senate,6 New York's Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1986 ("OCCA")7 was signed into law.'
Codified in New York Penal Law article 460, with additional pro-
cedural rules inserted into other statutes scattered throughout the
civil and criminal codes, OCCA, also known as "Baby RICO" or
"Little RICO", was created as a weapon to combat and control or-
scene of the movie.
4 See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1989 & Supp. 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186
(West 1988 & Supp. 1990); COLO REv. STAT. § 18-17-101 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53-393 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-3401 (1988); HAW. REV STAT. § 842-1 (1988 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-7801 (1987
& Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:41-1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.715 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 911 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1990).
5 N.Y.A. 11726, 209th Sess. (1986).
SN.Y.S. 4940-C, 209th Sess. (1986) (passed by Senate in early part of 1986, but not
passed by Assembly); N.Y.S. 9601, 209th Sess. (1986).
Ch. 516, [1986] N.Y. Laws 1124 (McKinney).
" Id. Effective as of November 1, 1986, OCCA is applicable to all acts committed there-
after. If, however, a pattern of criminal activity begins prior to the effective date, OCCA
would not apply unless the defendant's participation in the alleged pattern of criminal ac-
tivity included at least one felonious act committed on or after November 1, 1986. Id.; see
Mason v. Rothwax, 152 A.D.2d 272, 283, 548 N.Y.S.2d 926, 932 (1st Dep't 1989).
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ganized criminal activities in New York State.9 Written into
OCCA, however, were numerous protections, limitations and re-
strictions not found in any state or federal counterpart.
This Article will examine OCCA, trace its legislative history,
and compare its provisions with those of federal RICO. The Article
will then detail the elements required for a conviction under
OCCA. Special attention will be given to the forfeiture provisions
available to the prosecution against an OCCA defendant. Finally,
this Article will conclude with some observations on the direction
OCCA seems destined to take.
I. HiSTORCAL BACKGROUND
Before examining OCCA's scope and expanse, it is important
to understand what OCCA is not. Although patterned after federal
RICO,10 and similar in many respects to RICO statutes in other
states, New York's Baby RICO was drafted as a tool to bring state
law enforcers "closer to parity with the sophisticated criminal or-
ganizations they must try to fight."1 ' OCCA is not a broad based
statute to be used against the likes of Princeton/Newport or Drexel
Burnham. Rather, it is far more restrictive than its federal coun-
terpart, evincing New York's interest in enhancing the position
and strength of law enforcement agencies, while addressing legiti-
mate concerns for preventing prosecutorial abuse."2 Drawing on the
RICO experience and federal judicial interpretations of RICO's
breadth, New York purposefully narrowed the definition of the
requisite pattern of criminal activity for prosecution under OCCA
to ensure that the crimes making up the criminal enterprise were
not isolated incidents or part of a single criminal transaction. 3
See generally Governor's Jacket for ch. 516, [1986] N.Y. Laws 1124 (McKinney).
10 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990); see also Memorandum of New York
State Attorney General Robert Abrams (July 19, 1986) [hereinafter Abrams Memorandum]
(supporting signing of bill into law).
2' Letter from Assemblyman Daniel Feldman to Evan A. Davis, counsel to Governor
(July 18, 1986) [hereinafter Feldman Letter].
12 Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 516, N.Y. Laws (McKinney) (July 24,
1986), reprinted in [1986] N.Y. Laws 3175 (McKinney) [hereinafter Governor's
Memorandum].
" Governor's Memorandum, supra note 12. This thought is confirmed in New York
Penal Law section 460.00, which deals with the legislative findings. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 460.00 (McKinney 1989); see also Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 128 A.D.2d 339,
349, 515 N.Y.S.2d 794, 801 (2d Dep't 1987) (provisions of OCCA highlight "basic incompati-
bility" between federal and state jurisdiction), afl'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 450, 534
N.Y.S.2d 152 (1988).
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OCCA largely omitted the "continuity" requirement from the pat-
tern element, creating a more expansive definition of pattern than
that found under RICO.'14 And the legislature inserted into OCCA
several procedural rules, such as those relating to joinder and sev-
erance, in an effort to limit the prejudicial effect of multi-defend-
ant trials on innocent third parties or "small potatoes" caught in
the wake of major organized crime activities. 5
Baby RICO was designed as a prosecutorial tool. Much like
article 13-A of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR")' 6 and
other forfeiture provisions in New York's Penal Law and related
statutes, Baby RICO does not provide for a private or individual
cause of action.'7 Only the district attorney or affected state prose-
cutor I8 may bring such an action. Accordingly, none of the
problems encountered under RICO's private civil cause of action"
will arise under the New York statute.
Note that Baby RICO was codified in New York's Penal Law.
It was, therefore, intended to be criminal in nature. Its implemen-
tation is governed by the codes and procedures related to criminal
actions, and appropriate sanctions thereunder include imprison-
ment,2 0 criminal forfeiture, and stiff fines.2' Civil remedies, as they
are commonly regarded, are not enumerated as sanctions under
Baby RICO, although they may be sought as part of related forfei-
ture proceedings.22 Civil remedies under Baby RICO, however, are
not available without a criminal conviction.2 3
14 See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 200.40(1)(d)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
16 See Kessler, Quo Vadis? Assessing New York's Civil Forfeiture Law, 4 ToURo L.
REV. 253 passim (1988) [hereinafter Civil Forfeiture Law]; Kessler, Taking the Profit Out of
Crime: Asset Forfeiture, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 48-52 (July 1987); see also 2A C. WEINSTEIN, H.
KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVL PRACTICE art. 13-A (Bender 1986 & Supp. 1988)
(describing procedures for article 13-A forfeitures).
17 See Simpson, 128 A.D.2d at 358, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 807 (Spatt, J., dissenting).
See N.Y.PENAL LAW §§ 460.50, 460.60 (McKinney 1989).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
20 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.05 (McKinney 1987).
2' See id. § 460.30(5). The fines can amount to either triple the gross gain by the de-
fendant or loss to the victim caused by the crime, whichever is greater. Id.
22 See infra notes 123-60 and accompanying text (discussing CPLR articles 13-A & 13-
B).
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30 (McKinney 1989). Penal Law article 460 permits the execu-
tion of civil forfeiture proceedings under CPLR article 13-B against Baby RICO defendants.
Other forfeiture procedures pursuant to, and in tandem with, proceedings under OCCA are
also available, as is the use of all provisional remedies authorized by CPLR article 13-A,
which are available even in proceedings seeking criminal forfeiture. See id.
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II. OCCA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: NEW YORK AND RICO:
IMPERFECT TOGETHER
During five years of careful crafting, OCCA's drafters sought
to do more than just duplicate federal law. Their purpose was to
craft a statute which would "alleviate the desperate situation
which . . . preclude[d] [law enforcement authorities] from prose-
cuting" organized crime cases in New York.24 A major cause of the
continuing growth of organized criminal activities within New
York was deemed to be the inadequate and limited nature of the
sanctions and remedies available to state and local law enforce-
ment officials in dealing with the intricate, sophisticated, and va-
ried criminal conduct traditionally a hallmark of organized crime. 25
Existing penal law provisions were seen as primarily concerned
with the commission of specific and limited criminal acts without
regard to the relationships of those acts to legitimate or illicit en-
terprises controlled by organized crime.26 Since existing penal law
provisions only provided for the imposition of conventional crimi-
nal penalties, they were seen as inadequate and ineffective in de-
terring organized crime.
Additionally, in a more selfish vein, state prosecutors felt frus-
trated and short changed by the existing laws. Instead of having
the legal and mechanical machinery to prosecute organized crime
themselves, state authorities were compelled to surrender their
cases to federal authorities for prosecution under federal law. State
authorities were thereby compelled to rely on limited federal re-
sources in dealing with major crime in New York .2 The state also
suffered financially, having to settle for a minimal percentage of
any proceeds from seizures and forfeitures conducted with its fed-
eral counterparts.
Yet, RICO was not the answer. Legislators and other inter-
ested parties perceived many significant flaws in the federal stat-
ute. Congress had left it to the courts to clarify and overcome
many of the problems and potential abuses under RICO. Still, all
was not right with the code. State legislators were concerned that
the new powers given to prosecutors might be used inappropriately
2' Letter from New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch to Governor Cuomo (July 28,
1986) (in support of the Governor's signing proposed bill).
25 Letter from Nassau County District Attorney Dennis Dillon to Evan A. Davis, coun-
sel to the Governor (July 14, 1986) [hereinafter Dillon Letter].
20 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.00 (McKinney 1989).
27 See Dillon Letter, supra note 25.
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against individuals who had no, or only a peripheral, connection
with a criminal enterprise.2 Further, they did not want to include
within the scope of the state statute the garden-variety fraud or
breach of contract cases. 29 The drafters also sought to protect
against the inappropriate or abusive protection which RICO had
generated. They wanted to ensure that no one would be indicted
who had not committed at least three different crimes; that no one
would be joined at trial with any other defendant without having
previously joined with such other defendants while engaging in
criminal activity; and that no one would be prosecuted for such
criminal activity without proof of his intent to commit the crime of
enterprise corruption.30
Thus, the state legislature, with more than a decade of RICO
litigation to learn from, attempted to circumvent many of these
problems through precise drafting. Through its definition of "en-
terprise," the legislature limited OCCA's application "only to per-
sons employed by or associated with criminal enterprises" and
then only to the extent that those individuals participate in a "pat-
tern of criminal activity."3' Specifically, then, the legislature
drafted the statute to deal with individuals, not corporations. The
enterprise itself is not subject to prosecution. 2 This significant de-
parture from RICO represents an effort by the state legislators "to
protect against abuse and undue prejudice to defendants. '3 3
The Governor's Approval Memorandum accompanying the
signing of the bill into law indicated that "[c]rimes committed by
individuals who engage in a brief series of criminal acts in a[n] ad
hoc and unstructured group are not subject to prosecution under
the Act." ' OCCA was, therefore, designed for a limited but impor-
tant purpose: to combat organized crime by not only prosecuting
an underlying criminal offense, but by proving a defendant's role
within the broader pattern of criminal activity, his relationship to
any unlawful enterprise he may have corrupted and his relation-
28 Abrams Memorandum, supra note 10.
29 Letter from Assemblyman Melvin Miller to Evan A. Davis, Counsel to Governor
(July 16, 1986) [hereinafter Miller Letter] (urging approval of Assembly Bill No. 11726
(OCCA)).
30 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00, 460.20 (McKinney 1989); Abrams Memorandum, supra
note 10.
31 See Governor's Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3177.
22 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00, 460.20 (McKinney 1989).
33 Governor's Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3177.
3"Id.
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ship to the criminal enterprise of which he is a part. Clearly, the
crime of enterprise corruption was not to be charged
indiscriminately.
In step with this mandate, let it not be said that the state's
prosecutors have been anything but deliberate in using the statute.
As of this writing, seven indictments have been filed under
OCCA,36 all of which originated in the New York City metropoli-
tan area. The only case brought to trial resulted in an acquittal. 6
Most, in fact, resulted in pleas to crimes other than enterprise cor-
ruption. Indeed, only two of the indictments under OCCA resulted
in convictions for enterprise corruption.37
It is not clear why OCCA has been used so infrequently. Per-
haps it has to do with the complexities of initiating an OCCA pros-
ecution. The district attorney must first file a special information
certifying that she has "reviewed the substance of the evidence
presented to the .grand jury and concurs in the judgment that the
charge is consistent with [the] legislative findings" as set forth in
Penal Law section 460.00.38 The prosecutor then must notify any
"affected district attorneys"3 9 of her intention to proceed with an
OCCA prosecution and obtain the consent of any such district at-
torney who may have concurrent jurisdiction over the criminal
activity.
31 People v. Stern, No. 10001/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989) (Klienman, J.) (murder
case); People v. Pagano, No. 89-120 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1989) (gambling, loanshark-
ing, and extortion case); People v. Moscatiello, No. 8081/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989)
(labor racketeering as alleged enterprise); People v. Edmonson, No. 2849/89 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1989) (narcotics trafficking as alleged enterprise in 70-count indictment); People v.
Grillo, No. 5186/88 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988) (murder, loansharking, and promotion of
gambling as alleged enterprise), aff'd (1990); People v. Abdullah, No. 6572/88 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1988) (fraudulent real estate transactions as alleged enterprise); People v.
Jeudy, No. 10699/87 (1987) (fraudulent insurance contracts for livery cabs as alleged
enterprise).
11 Abdullah, No. 6572/88. The only courts to have addressed OCCA are those con-
fronting issues relating to OCCA's elaborate and extensive provisions regarding the issue of
double jeopardy. See People v. Bokum, 145 Misc. 2d 860, 869, 548 N.Y.S.2d 604, 610 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1989); People v. Cooper, 143 Misc. 2d 654, 655, 541 N.Y.S.2d 713, 713 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 40.50 (McKinney Pam. 1990).
" Stern, No. 10001/89 (pleaded to Grand Larceny felony counts and related charges);
GriUo, No. 5186/88.
'8 N.Y. CraM. PROc. LAW § 200.65 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
' See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.40, 460.50, 460.60 (McKinney 1989). The concept of "af-
fected district attorney" stems from the realization that, due to the nature of some organ-
ized criminal activity, more than one county or jurisdiction may be affected by the activity.
Accordingly, the prosecutor wishing to proceed with the case must secure the consent of any
other prosecutor who has concurrent jurisdiction over the crime. Id. § 460.60.
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Another possible source of restriction on the statute's use is
the construction of OCCA. In the statute's section on legislative
findings, the legislature made it clear that, although the definitions
used throughout the statute should be given their plain meaning,
they should be construed "in the context of the legislative pur-
poses set forth in these findings. '40 Thus, even when the technical
requirements of an enterprise corruption crime under OCCA are
satisfied, the legislative findings caution that the statute "is not
intended to be employed to prosecute relatively minor or isolated
acts of criminality which . . . can be adequately and more fairly
prosecuted as separate offenses. ' 41 "[W]hether to prosecute ... is
essentially [a question] of fairness," best addressed "by those insti-
tutions of government which have traditionally exercised that
function: the grand jury, the public prosecutor, and an indepen-
dent judiciary. '42 This "fairness" doctrine, then, becomes the sub-
stance of a pre-trial motion to dismiss the charges in the interests
of justice when the court deems the OCCA prosecution is "incon-
sistent with the stated legislative findings. 43
Issues of procedure, particularly joinder and severance, may
also factor into a prosecutor's decision to proceed with an OCCA
prosecution. Because of the legislature's stated desire to protect a
minor participant from such a prosecution,44 the legislature
granted the judiciary broad powers to deal with potentially preju-
dicial situations arising from a combined trial under OCCA.45 The
rules attempt to remove from OCCA's imposing reach those par-
ticipants playing relatively minor roles in an enterprise corruption
crime.
Upon the motion of the defendant or the state, the court may,
for good cause, grant a severance of defendants, order the enter-
prise corruption charges and other counts to be tried separately or
provide "whatever other relief justice requires." The statute de-
fines "good cause" as including, but not limited to, a finding that
proof of one or more criminal acts alleged to have been commit-
ted by one defendant but not one or more of the others creates a
-0 Id. § 460.00.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990); see infra note 128 and
accompanying text (detailed discussion of the interest of justice dismissal).
44 Governor's Memorandum, supra note 12.
4 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.40(1)(d)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
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likelihood that the jury may not be able to consider separately
the proof as it relates to each defendant, or in such a case, given
the scope of the pattern of criminal activity charged against all
the defendants, a particular defendant's comparatively minor role
in it creates a likelihood of prejudice against him.4 '
The history of these changes is important. Set against the
backdrop of "mass RICO trials" conducted in the federal courts
under RICO, the legislature was deeply concerned with the likeli-
hood of "spillover prejudice" by liberal consolidation of non-join-
able criminal offenses or defendants.47 To limit the potential of
prejudicial joinder, OCCA provided several modifications to the ex-
isting laws.
First, association with a criminal enterprise is a requirement.
Since each criminal act must be performed for the purpose of ad-
vancing or participating in the affairs of a known criminal enter-
prise, the criminal conduct joined is, in virtually all cases, the type
of conduct which would have been joinable under existing require-
ments of a common scheme or plan.
Also, the new statute ensures that "strangers" do not sit as co-
defendants.48 Unlike federal law, which carved out broad joinder
provisions for RICO prosecutions, 49 every defendant joined by vir-
tue of an OCCA charge would have been joinable with one or more
of his co-defendants under previously existing joinder rules.50
OCCA also requires severance where there are disparities of
proof or where the defendant is a relatively minor participant in a
larger scheme. Although there were already existing provisions
dealing with severance,5 the legislature deemed it necessary to ex-
plicitly mandate severance in cases where an OCCA prosecution
might lead to spillover prejudice.52 The thought of trying an OCCA
case several times against different individuals might also give a
prosecutor pause before going forward with such a prosecution.
Further, most prosecutors, with the possible exception of the
state Organized Crime Task Force, do not have the manpower to
devote to the investigation and prosecution of complex organized
46 Id.
41 Miller Letter, supra note 29.
48 Id.; see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.40(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
49 See generally J. RAoF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 10.02, 10.03.
11 N.Y. CrIM. PROC. LAW § 200.40(1)(d)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
51 Id. § 200.20(3) (McKinney 1982).
52 See Miller Letter, supra note 29.
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crime cases. Indeed, any of the individuals subject to an OCCA
prosecution could probably be prosecuted for committing felonies,
such as homicide, drug distribution, or gambling, of which many
carry equal or greater weight than the crime of enterprise corrup-
tion, which is a class "B" felony, punishable by up to twenty-five
years' imprisonment. Investigating and prosecuting the enterprise
corruption case may take months, even years.53 Accordingly, it may
not be a worthwhile expenditure of money and resources to prose-
cute someone for a "B" felony, when the "normal" course of crimi-
nal prosecution would result in a similar outcome.54
Finally, it is quite clear that the legislature did not intend to
include within the scope of OCCA the run-of-the-mill fraud or
breach of contract. In a letter to Governor Mario Cuomo encourag-
ing the signing of the bill into law, Assemblyman Melvin Miller,
one of the sponsors of the-bill, stated:
[T]he extraordinary sanctions allowed under the Act should be
limited for those who not only commit crimes but do so as part of
an organized crime enterprise. Present law is adequate to punish
ordinary white-collar crime .... For that reason, it was not the
sponsors' intent to redefine or sanction anew conduct already
punishable under current law. Similarly, mere corruption of a le-
gitimate enterprise by a pattern of criminal activity is insufficient
to justify prosecution under this Act .... Rather, the bill now
requires association with an ascertainably distinct criminal enter-
prise in addition to corruption of a legitimate enterprise by crimi-
nal activity. In this way we are assured that the Act will only be
applied to those who knowingly and voluntarily seek to advance
an organized criminal enterprise by their misconduct.55
Because of the important differences between OCCA and simi-
lar federal and state statutes, cases decided in other jurisdictions
pursuant to statutes which may seem similar in nature to OCCA
must be scrutinized carefully before they are relied upon as per-
suasive authority in New York.
So what is the focus of OCCA? The legislature conceded its
difficulty in defining OCCA's targeted "enemy." "In part because
" As of this writing, an OCCA investigation in the Bronx has already lasted more than
two years, with the prosecution still presenting evidence to the Grand Jury and with no trial
date in sight.
" See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20 (McKinney 1989). Enterprise corruption is a class "B"
felony and is punishable by up to twenty-five years imprisonment. See id. §§ 460.20,
70.00(2)(b).
'" Miller Letter, supra note 29.
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of its highly diverse nature, it is impossible to precisely define
what organized crime is."'56 The legislature did, however, attempt
to define and criminalize "what organized crime does. '57 The result
was article 460.
III. ESSENTIAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. The Requisite Elements
A person is guilty of the class "B" felony of enterprise corrup-
tion when he:
[1] intentionally conducts or participates in the affairs of an
enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal activity; or
[2] intentionally acquires or maintains any interest in or con-
trol of an enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal ac-
tivity; or
[3] participates in a pattern of criminal activity and know-
ingly invests any proceeds derived from [either the criminal activ-
ity itself or] the investment or use of those proceeds, in an
enterprise.5 8
In addition to proof of the elements themselves, a prosecutor must
show, under each of the theories above, that the defendant com-
mitted the requisite acts (1) while knowing of the existence of a
criminal enterprise and the nature of its activities and (2) while
employed by or associated with the criminal enterprise.5 9
Four significant terms determine the primary elements of en-
terprise corruption: enterprise,60 criminal enterprise,61 pattern of
criminal activity62 and participation in a pattern of criminal
activity.6 3
1. Enterprise and Criminal Enterprise
An "enterprise" includes both a legitimate enterprise as pro-
vided for in Penal Law section 175.00 and a criminal enterprise.6 4
11 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.00 (McKinney 1989).
57 Id.
58 Id. § 460.20(1).
99 Id.
60 See id. § 460.10(2) (definition of "enterprise" for purposes of article 460).
01 See id. § 460.10(3) (definition of "criminal enterprise").
62 See id. § 460.10(4) (definition of "pattern of criminal activity").
3' See id. § 460.20(2) (definition of "participation in pattern of criminal activity").
" See id. § 460.10(2); see also id. § 175.00(1) (McKinney 1988) (definition of "enter-
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This definition mirrors that under RICO. 5 OCCA specifies, how-
ever, that the enterprise "need not be the criminal enterprise by
which the person is employed or with which he is associated, and
may be a legitimate enterprise."66
Note, however, that the enterprise itself is not subject to pros-
ecution. The statute only applies to individuals and, to them, only
to the extent that they participated in a pattern of criminal activ-
ity.17 Further, an enterprise must be "an ascertainable structure
distinct from a pattern of criminal activity."68 This differs from
RICO, under which an enterprise may be limited to the "pattern of
racketeering activity. 6ee Thus, under OCCA, although the pattern
may be part of the enterprise, the enterprise must be distinct from
the pattern. 0
A criminal enterprise is defined as "a group of persons sharing
a common purpose of engaging in criminal conduct, associated in
an ascertainable structure distinct from a pattern of criminal activ-
ity, and with a continuity of existence, structure and criminal pur-
pose beyond the scope of individual criminal incidents. 7 1 This is a
significant departure from RICO.72
Under OCCA, the enterprise itself may be legitimate7 3 or ille-
gitimate. If the special information alleges that the defendant ac-
ted intentionally or participated in the affairs of the enterprise by
participation in a pattern of criminal activity, the enterprise itself
must be illegitimate. 4
On the other hand, a legitimate enterprise may be a target of
prosecution only where the defendant commits the crime by inten-
tionally acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of an
enterprise or by knowingly investing in the enterprise any proceeds
prise" for purposes of article 175).
6' See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-82 (1981).
66 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20(3) (McKinney 1989).
:7 See id. §§ 460.00, 460.20.
8 Id. § 460.10(3).
69 See United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983).
70 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(3) (McKinney 1989).
71 Id.; cf. id. § 175.00(1) (McKinney 1988) (definition of enterprise).
7 Compare id. § 460.10(3) (McKinney 1989) (narrow construction of "enterprise") with
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (less specific construction of "enterprise").
71 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 175.00(1) (McKinney 1988).
74 Id. § 460.20(1)(a). If the acts underlying the crime are alleged under Penal Law sec-
tion 460.20 subdivisions (b) or (c), the enterprise may also be illegitimate, but such is not a
requirement.
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derived either from the conduct or from the investment or use of
those proceeds. This view of an enterprise is substantially more
limited than that under RICO.7 5
It is interesting to note the pains taken by the legislature to
include legitimate enterprise within OCCA. Such in evidenced by
the Governor's Memorandum:
The reach of the bill is not limited to traditional organized crime
families or crime syndicates; rather, it includes any group with a
shared criminal purpose and a continuity of existence and struc-
ture. Crimes committed by individuals who engage in a brief se-
ries of criminal acts in a[n] ad hoc and unstructured group are
not subject to prosecution under the Act. If, however, the group
demonstrates a structure-such as the hierarchy of a "Cosa Nos-
tra" family, or the specialization of a narcotics, loansharking or
gambling operation, the criminal enterprise requirement is
satisfied. 71
The Memorandum continues:
Significantly, the definition of criminal enterprise in this bill does
not require that the structure of a criminal enterprise be distinct
from that of a legitimate one. This accomplishes two important
results. First, it makes clear that groups that have both legitimate
and illegitimate purposes, like a social club that "fronts" for a
criminal gang, or a pawn shop that is the center of a fencing oper-
ation, can constitute criminal enterprises. Second, it permits the
hierarchy of and positions within a legitimate enterprise-for ex-
ample, a labor union, trade association or government agency-to
contribute to the structure of a criminal group existing and oper-
ating within that legitimate enterprise. Assuming the resulting
structure of the group meets the definitional requirements for a
criminal enterprise, its members and associates may be prose-
cuted under the bill.7"
Assemblyman Miller, one of the bill's sponsors, similarly un-
derstood OCCA to reach legitimate business. In his letter to Gover-
nor Cuomo, he explained that "there are no selective exclusions or
exemptions within the bill. Any enterprise may be victimized by
organized crime. This includes businesses, unions and political
units.
'78
71 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981).
71 Governor's Memorandum, supra note 12.
7 Id.
71Miller Letter, supra note 29.
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Finally, the statute itself confirms that "the concept of crimi-
nal enterprise should not be limited to traditional criminal syndi-
cates or crime families. '79
One glaring omission from RICO's definition of enterprise cor-
ruption involves the act of participation."s OCCA describes the
requisite act as follows:
A person is guilty of enterprise corruption when, having knowl-
edge of the existence of a criminal enterprise and the nature of its
activities, and being employed by or associated with such enter-
prise, he:
(a) intentionally conducts or participates in the affairs of an
enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal
activity ....81
Under RICO,
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.82
OCCA's requirement that each defendant be associated with a
criminal enterprise is probably the most fundamental distinction
between OCCA and other RICO-type statutes. As illustrated,
RICO permits prosecution of individuals who engage in a pattern
of criminal activity without further proof that the criminal activity
was accomplished for the purpose of participating in or advancing
the affairs of a criminal enterprise with a separate, distinct, and
ascertainable structure and a continuity of existence and purpose
beyond the scope of the pattern itself.83
The members of the State Assembly Codes Committee draft-
ing OCCA believed that the new law's extraordinary sanctions
should be reserved for those who commit crimes as part of an or-
ganized criminal enterprise."4 Existing law was seen as adequate to
punish the ordinary white collar criminal. Accordingly, it was not
the drafters' intent to redefine or sanction anew conduct already
19 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.00 (McKinney 1989).
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
8 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20(1)(a) (McKinney 1989).
82 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
a- Id. § 1962.
", Miller Letter, supra note 29.
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punishable under existing laws.85 Similarly, mere corruption of a
legitimate enterprise by a pattern of criminal activity was deemed
insufficient to justify prosecution under the new law.86
Rather, under OCCA, the law requires association with an as-
certainably distinct criminal enterprise in addition to corruption of
a legitimate enterprise by criminal activity. So drafted, the legisla-
tors wished to assure that OCCA would only be applied to those
who knowingly and voluntarily seek to advance an organized crimi-
nal enterprise by their misconduct.8 7
Apparently, New York sought to avoid the voluminous litiga-
tion which arose while the federal courts attempted to define a
"pattern of criminal activity." 88 Thus, under OCCA, the nexus re-
quired -is between the defendant and the pattern of criminal activ-
ity, not between the defendant and the enterprise. This fine tuning
by the state legislature should prevent unnecessary and excessive
litigation regarding this section of the statute.
2. Pattern
Under RICO, a person employs a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity when he commits two or more specified criminal acts, one of
which occurred after RICO's effective date and the last of which
occurred within ten years, excluding any period of imprisonment,
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.89 The
racketeering activity must have sufficient continuity and relation-
ship to constitute a pattern.90 Left vague for nearly a decade, the
pattern element of RICO was finally clarified somewhat in 1989
when the United States Supreme Court held that, to prove a pat-
tern of racketeering activity under RICO, a "prosecutor must show
that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount
85 Id.
86 Id. "Since the pattern of criminal activity is separately prosecutable there is no need
to further prosecute the same conduct merely because the defendant is associated with a
legitimate enterprise." Id.
87 Id.
See generally J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.03(1).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
90 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989);
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985); United States v. Stofsky, 409
F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); see also J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, §
2.03(3).
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to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity."91
Note the differences between these requirements and those
under OCCA. New York's legislators again learned from their fed-
eral cousins. Under OCCA, at least three criminal acts, not just
two, must be committed within a ten year period. 2 These acts may
not be isolated incidents or multiple incidents of a single criminal
transaction."3 Additionally, the acts must be either related to one
another through a common scheme or plan or must have been
"committed, solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally
aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for
the commission thereof and associated with or in the criminal en-
terprise. '9 4 Although three acts are required, only one common
scheme or plan will suffice.
3. Participation
"Participation," as it relates to the pattern of criminal activ-
ity, is a concept foreign under federal RICO. Under OCCA, a per-
son participates in a pattern of criminal activity when, with the
intent to participate in or advance the affairs of the criminal enter-
prise, he commits at least three criminal acts included in the pat-
tern. 5 Two of the three acts must be felonies other than conspir-
acy,96 two of the acts, at least one of which is a felony, must have
occurred within five years of the commencement of the criminal
action, 7 and each of the acts committed must have occurred
within three years of a prior act.9"
Note two important requirements. First, the individual must
have the mens rea specifically addressed to the crime. Intent,
therefore, is critical.9  Second, the individual must have commit-
ted, as a principal or an accomplice, at least three of the criminal
acts included in the pattern. 0 ° Thus, more than just being a by-
stander is required for the person to have participated in the pat-
,1 Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2900 (emphasis in original).
92 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(4)(a) (McKinney 1989).
03 Id. § 460.10(4)(b).
Id. § 460.10(4)(c).
" Id. § 460.20(2).
Id. § 460.20(2)(a).
:7 Id. § 460.20(2)(b).
98 Id. § 460.20(2)(c).
:" See Abrams Memorandum, supra note 10, at 2.
100 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20(2) (McKinney 1989). This provision precludes the
prosecution of mere bystanders. See id.
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tern. As stated by Assemblyman Miller:
[T]he bill requires more than a mere showing of corrupt criminal
acts by one or more individuals. There must be a further showing
of association with a criminal enterprise which has a scope and
purpose beyond the particular conspiracy or corrupt acts in-
volved. Thus, a plan to gain a government contract by bid-rigging
and bribery would be punishable by existing penal provisions....
If, however, there is further proof that acquisition of the contract
is merely one step in advancing the affairs of a separate criminal
enterprise, then OCCA would be employed.110
4. Criminal Activity
Finally, the statute enumerates the "criminal acts" eligible for
inclusion in a pattern.102 Any felony listed in the New York Penal
Law may constitute a criminal act for purposes of enterprise cor-
ruption.10 3 A conspiracy or an attempt to commit any felony will
also constitute a criminal act under OCCA, even though some of
these crimes may classify as misdemeanors. 04 Certain other
crimes, codified outside the Penal Law but traditionally linked to
organized criminal activities, also qualify as predicate acts.10 5
These include specifically enumerated provisions of the Tax
Law, 06 the Environmental Conservation Law' 0 7 and the General
Business Law. 0 8
B. Statutory Limitations
Penal Law section 460.25 sets forth evidentiary limitations on
the proof admissible to establish the elements of enterprise corrup-
101 Miller Letter, supra note 29.
102 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1989).
103 See id.
104 See id. § 460.10(1).
108 Id. § 460.10(1)(b).
10I See id. N.Y. TAx LAw § 289-b(4) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990) (criminal penalties
for failure to pay gasoline tax); id. § 433(3) (McKinney 1987) (criminal penalties for failure
to pay alcoholic beverage tax); id. § 487(e) (criminal penalties for failure to pay cigarette
tax).
107 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSMERV. LAW §3
17-0101-17-1907, 71-1933 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1990) (criminal penalties for water
pollution).
108 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 460.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW § 347
(McKinney 1984) (criminal penalties for establishing or maintaining monopolies); see also
id. § 358 (criminal penalties for fraudulent practices regarding securities).
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tion.10 1 Although it only restates what should be apparent from
reading the definitions of the crime, the legislators' concern regard-
ing prosecution of minor participants persuaded them to expressly
limit the available proof.1 0
Subdivision two of Penal Law section 460.25 presents a list of
activities which are not unlawful. They include: (a) the acquisition
of five percent or less of an insurer's securities on the open market
without the intent to control the enterprise; (b) a deposit in a sav-
ings and loan association or similar financial institution that cre-
ates an ownership interest in that association or institution; (c) the
purchase of shares in cooperatively owned residential or commer-
cial property: and (d) the purchase of non-voting shares in a lim-
ited partnership without the intent of controlling or participating
in the control of the partnership."' This subdivision was meant to
preclude the prosecution of an individual who, through the invest-
ment in an enterprise, created an equitable interest in the enter-
prise. Such an equitable interest, however, does not create the kind
of control over the enterprise that the investment prohibition of
Penal Law section 460.20(1) seeks to prohibit. Notably, a similar
prohibition under RICO applies the securities restriction to less
than one percent of the outstanding shares of a particular class of
securities in an enterprise." 2 OCCA's five percent restriction fur-
ther illustrates the legislators' strong desire to protect individuals
against government overreaching 13 and to ensure that borderline
cases weigh in favor of the individual.
C. Forfeiture Under OCCA
Both criminal and civil forfeiture are available to the prosecu-
tor under OCCA. There are, however, important substantive and
mechanical differences between the two.
109 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.25 (McKinney 1989).
110 Id. § 460.25(2)(a)-(d).
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). "[S]ecurities fraud and theft conducted through le-
gitimate and illegitimate organizations were plainly contemplated. In fact, 'harm to inves-
tors' was one of the targeted evils specifically mentioned," when RICO was enacted. Kaplan
v. Ritter, 71 N.Y.2d 222, 230 n.4, 519 N.E.2d 802, 806 n.4, 525 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 n.4 (1987)
(citing Preamble, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-450, 84 Stat. 922
(1970)).
Feldman Letter, supra note 11.
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1. Civil v. Criminal Forfeiture
The nature of criminal forfeiture under OCCA is best under-
stood by comprehending the purpose of the statute itself. OCCA,
as with most comparable statutes, is designed to attack members
of organized crime both criminally and financially. Although it is
important to punish these individuals with prison terms and tradi-
tional criminal sanctions, state and federal prosecutors have found
that financial punishment is equally as effective. Accordingly, they
have attempted to "take the profit out of crime," '114 and make it
financially less rewarding for those involved in organized crime to
practice their trade. Forfeiture is one such tool.
First, some background. The primary distinction between
criminal and civil forfeiture is mechanical. An action for criminal
forfeiture, such as the one under OCCA, is part of the criminal
proceeding. The same Grand Jury that votes the criminal indict-
ment files a special information charging criminal forfeiture. The
special information must specify the subject of the forfeiture and
include a "plain and concise factual statement which sets forth the
basis for the forfeiture.' 1 15 Broad criminal discovery procedures
are available to the prosecutor through the grand jury and the de-
fendant may obtain disclosure to prepare his defense on the forfei-
ture issues." 6 The ultimate forfeiture may be imposed by the same
trier of fact who decides the criminal case, usually through a bifur-
cated procedure, following the criminal conviction." 7 Alternatively,
the court may impose a fine not exceeding three times the gross
value of either the defendant's gain or the victim's loss, whichever
is greater." 8 The existence of the special information, however, is
kept secret from the trier of fact until after a guilty verdict has
114 Governor's Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3176.
115 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(2)(a) (McKinney 1989).
2' See id. § 460.80. For a guide to the procedures governing discovery in New York
criminal cases, see N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 240.90 (McKinney 1989).
117 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(2)(a) (McKinney 1989). However, if the defendant
waives his constitutional rights to a trial by jury and proceeds with a bench trial, the pro-
ceedings on the special information and the indictment are not bifurcated. A judge is con-
sidered better able to separate the evidence on the two issues and to be unprejudiced by the
admission of the evidence on forfeiture. See id. § 460.30 commentary at 572.
I's Id. § 460.30(5). In imposing the fine, the court is directed to consider the seriousness
of the defendant's conduct, the proportionality of the fine to the defendant's conduct, the
fine's impact upon victims and the enterprise corrupted by the criminal conduct, and the
economic circumstances of the defendant, including the effect of the fine upon the defend-
ant's immediate family. Note that the consideration of these factors is mandatory, not prec-
atory. Id.
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been rendered on the criminal act."' This prevents the evidence
bearing on forfeiture from prejudicing the defendant during his
trial on the criminal charges.
A person must be convicted of enterprise corruption before his
property is subject to forfeiture. 2 ' An innocent third party caught
in the web of a forfeiture proceeding instituted against his prop-
erty by the prosecutor may protect himself by bringing an action
to determine adverse claims under CPLR section 1327.121 Section
1327 gives the court broad discretionary authority to protect the
rights of any non-party who asserts an interest in the attached
property. The court may award whatever relief it deems appropri-
ate."'22 Section 1327 also permits the adverse claimant to commence
the action in the county where the property levied upon is located,
regardless of where the forfeiture action is pending. This makes it
easier for the claimant to protect his property.
A civil forfeiture proceeding, in contrast, is usually brought in
rem directly against the offending property.123 It is a civil action,
separate and distinct from the criminal trial. Usually, the civil ac-
tion is initiated after the criminal matter is completed and, except
in a few select instances, the civil action requires a judgment of
conviction of a felony to proceed. Unlike its criminal counterpart,
however, civil forfeiture may flow from any felony conviction, re-
gardless of its relationship to the subject of the forfeiture action. 24
Under OCCA, once a forfeiture verdict of guilty is rendered,
the defendant may present additional argument and evidence to
the court regarding the proportionality of the punishment to the
conduct 25 and the weight of the evidence.'26 This provides for an
unusual set of procedures. 127 Upon the defendant's request, the
court may, in the interests of justice, substitute its factual findings
119 Id. § 460.30(2)(a),(b).
120 Id. § 460.30(3)(b).
121 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1327 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
122 Cf. id. 2661 (McKinney 1980).
122 An important exception to this is New York's CPLR article 13-A, an in personam
civil action brought against a defendant. See Civil Forfeiture Law, supra note 16, at 254-57
(detailed discussion of article 13-A).
I24 See D. SMITH, PROSECTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 2.03 (Bender 1985 &
Supp. 1988) (discussion of differences between in rem and in personam forfeiture
proceedings).
221 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(1)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1989) (conduct may require per-
son convicted to forfeit property or interest to state).
12 Id. § 460.30(2)(c).
1 2 See id. § 460.30(2)(c).
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for that of the jury, weighing factors including whether the forfei-
ture is disproportionate either to the defendant's gain or to the
defendant's conduct on which the forfeiture is based. The court
may modify, set aside, limit, or otherwise condition the order of
forfeiture. This gives substantial power to the presiding judge.128
2. Criminal Forfeiture
Under OCCA, criminal forfeiture may be effectuated in any
one of three ways, each paralleling a manner in which a defendant
can commit the crime of enterprise corruption. Some of the statu-
tory language in this regard was borrowed from the.federal law.
129
Its purpose is to sever the tainted link between an individual con-
victed of enterprise corruption and the enterprise. Its implementa-
tion, therefore, is primarily focused on stocks, bonds, professional
licenses, and other similar assets. Unlike its federal cousin, OCCA
requires a predicate enterprise corruption conviction and provides
for the disallowance of a forfeiture, in whole or in part, if the pro-
spective forfeiture is disproportionate to the defendant's "gain"
1 30
or "conduct." '31 Criminal forfeiture under OCCA is also unique in
requiring that the individual's use of the property being forfeited
must have "contributed directly and materially to the crime for
which he was convicted.' '1 32
Forfeiture under Penal Law section 460.30(1)(a), aimed pri-
marily at insiders, requires a direct and material causation be-
tween the interests subject to the forfeiture and the crime. The
statute also strays from the shadow of its federal counterpart by
including a proportionality requirement. Forfeiture cannot be dis-
proportionate to the defendant's gain from his association with or
128 Civil forfeiture under OCCA, in that regard resembles the dismissal provision under
section 1311(4) of CPLR article 13-A, the most encompassing "interests of justice" provision
in New York law. See Civil Forfeiture Law, supra note 16, at 280; see also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc.
LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991) (court may dismiss pending forfeiture action
"in interests of justice").
129 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (RICO and OCCA have almost identical procedures to effec-
tuate criminal forfeiture).
130 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1989).
131 Id. § 460.30(1)(b).
132 Id. § 460.30(1)(a). Notably, this is akin to the requirement under article 13-A for the
forfeiture of an instrumentality. N.Y. CrV. PRAC. L. & R. 1310(4) (McKinney 1989). Distin-
guish this with the federal statute requiring that "[t]here must be a direct or substantial
relationship" between the act and the crime for the property to have been used "in further-
ance" of a crime. United States v. One 1984 Ford Van, 861 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1977).
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employment by the enterprise. This requirement is analogous to
section 1311(4) of the CPLR, which provides for dismissal in the
interest of justice if the value of the subject of the forfeiture action
is disproportionately high in relation to the defendant's interest or
participation in the crime. 133
Forfeiture pursuant to subdivision (b) is limited to the interest
or proceeds which the defendant acquired or maintained in an en-
terprise through a pattern of criminal activity. This section, which
also includes a proportionality requirement, is aimed at outsiders
to the enterprise who infiltrate the enterprise by diabolic means.
Forfeiture under subdivisions (a) and (b) is limited to the in-
terest that a defendant may have in the enterprise. It does not
reach gains that the defendant may have taken from the enter-
prise, such as cash, or items the defendant may have acquired with
the ill-gotten gains, such as real estate or jewelry. In contrast, civil
forfeiture under article 13-A does reach gains from the criminal
activity, including proceeds, substituted proceeds and any appreci-
ation in value that the proceeds may have acquired. Only the latter
is recoverable under OCCA's criminal forfeiture scheme.13 4
Interests or proceeds which the defendant procured by invest-
ing the proceeds of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity are also subject to forfeiture. 135 Aimed primarily at the
racketeer who invests his gains, this section is restricted by the
limitations set forth in section 460.25.136 Again, a proportionality
133 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1311(4) (McKinney Supp. 1990); see also Civil Forfei-
ture Law, supra note 16, at 280. It is also the model upon which the legislature based Penal
Law article 480, the newly enacted state criminal forfeiture statute aimed at controlled sub-
stance felony offenses. Ch. 655, [1990] N.Y. Laws (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 480.05(1)(a),(b),(2) & 480.10(6)(d) (McKinney 1990)). Penal Law article 480, enacted as
part of Assembly Bill 12141-A, was signed into law by Governor Cuomo on July 18, 1990,
and took effect on November 1, 1990. Article 480 permits the trier-of-fact to consider, both
before and after the verdict, whether the forfeiture is disproportionate to the defendant's
profit from the offense, interest in the property, or participation in the conduct upon which
the forfeiture is based. The defendant is also permitted to seek a dismissal of the special
forfeiture information as secured upon evidence presented to the grand jury which was le-
gally insufficient to support a claim against his property interest. Id. § 480.20(6)(d). The
article also bars the imposition of any other state or local forfeiture action arising from the
same conduct once a criminal forfeiture verdict is imposed thereunder Id. § 480.25.
,34 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(1) (McKinney 1989).
"5 Id. § 460.30(1)(c).
138 Id. § 460.25. The four examples specifically deleted from the definition of investing
are set forth in Penal Law § 460.25. They include (a) the acquisition of five percent or less
of an insurer's securities on the open market without the intent to control the enterprise; (b)
a deposit in a savings and loan association or similar financial institution that creates an
ownership interest in that association or institution; (c) the purchase of shares in coopera-
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requirement is imposed.
All three categories of interests subject to criminal forfeiture
are limited to interests in or derived from the enterprise. Accord-
ingly, the scope of the enterprise determines the scope of the for-
feiture. The standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, 13 7 and
all of the forfeiture actions must be premised upon a conviction for
enterprise corruption. The prosecution must elect one remedy
from among the OCCA forfeitures. 138 This, in part, explains why
civil remedies and forfeitures should not be underestimated when
dealing with an action under OCCA. The imposition of any forfei-
ture penalty under OCCA, however, does not preclude the applica-
tion of any other criminal penalties or civil remedies under New
York law. 3' Similarly, the payment of restitution to the crime vic-
tim pursuant to OCCA does not preclude, limit, or impair the per-
petrator's liability for damages in any subsequent civil action or
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the victim for an amount in
excess of the restitution. 40
Disposition of assets under OCCA's criminal forfeitures is
made pursuant to CPLR section 1349.141 Prior to November 1,
1990, the legislature prioritized distribution of the assets by first
satisfying all outstanding property liens and providing restitution,
reparations, and damages to those victimized by the defendant in
this or any other crime. 14 Where a forfeiture action was grounded
tively-owned residential or commercial property; and (d) the purchase of non-voting shares
in a limited partnership without the intent of controlling or participating in the control of
the partnership. Id. § 460.25(2).
137 Id. § 460.30(2)(b). But see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1310, 1311(3)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1990) (civil forfeiture requires proof by preponderance of evidence).
1' The choices are double or triple gain-based fines pursuant to Penal Law sections
80.00(1)(b) and 460.30(5), criminal forfeiture pursuant to Penal Law § 460.30(1), or reme-
dies pursuant to CPLR article 13-A. Note, however, that an action for the forfeiture of
proceeds or substituted proceeds pursuant to article 13-A may be brought in addition to an
OCCA forfeiture, but only where the assets seized in the civil proceeding are not subject to
forfeiture in the criminal case. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(6) (McKinney 1989).
119 See id. § 460.30(7).
140 See id. §§ 460.30(7), 460.30(8).
"I See id. § 460.30(4); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1349 (McKinney Supp. 1990). The lone
exception to this distribution scheme arises when the court sentences the forfeiture defend-
ant to pay a fine. Then, the monies collected shall be paid as restitution to victims of the
crime for medically expenses actually incurred, loss of earnings, or property loss or damaged
caused by the criminal conduct. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30(5) (McKinney 1989). Any money
remaining must be paid to the state treasury. Id. Additional rules apply when the underly-
ing criminal activity is comprised of one or more narcotics-related activity. Id.
1,2 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 1349 (McKinney 1989).
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upon a narcotics or drug related crime, 4 s fifty percent of the mon-
ies remaining went to the state Substance Abuse Service Fund. In
all forfeiture cases, twenty-five percent of the monies remaining
went to the law enforcement fund of the county or jurisdiction rep-
resented by the claiming authority. All monies remaining were dis-
tributed to the general fund of the state or county, depending on
the case. None of this money, however, was earmarked by the stat-
ute for a specific use and, therefore, could be used by the respec-
tive entity for any legitimate purpose.
State prosecutors remained troubled by this disposition
scheme, especially in light of the perquisites available to prosecu-
tors under federal law.14 4 State authorities claimed that a signifi-
cant number of cases with forfeiture potential under article 13-A
were declined or transferred to federal authorities since article 13-
A failed to provide for reimbursement for the resources expended
by law enforcement to investigate and litigate forfeiture actions.
Accordingly, bowing to strong lobbying, the state legislature passed
a new dispositional scheme for forfeited assets. 45
Effective November 1, 1990, the claiming agent receives first
crack at the forfeited monies. The claiming agent is reimbursed for
monies directly expended in the underlying criminal investigation
for the purchase of contraband which were converted into a non-
monetary form or which were otherwise not recovered. 46 The
claiming agent may also apply to the court for retention for law
enforcement purposes of forfeited vehicles, vessels, or aircraft
which are not subject to an unsatisfied perfected lien. 147 Where the
claiming agent does not apply to the court for such property, the
claiming authorities, including police and sheriff departments, may
apply for the same consideration. 48
If no claim for retention is made, the property is sold and ap-
portioned pursuant to the remaining distribution schedule.149 All
outstanding property liens and restitution, reparations, and dam-
ages to those victimized by the defendant in this or any other
"I See N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 220, §§ 221.30, 221.55 (McKinney 1989).
.. See Civil Forfeiture Law, supra note 16, at 295-97.
-I- Ch. 655, [1990] N.Y. Laws (McKinney) (codified in N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1349
(1990) (effective November 1, 1990).
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crime are paid, as provided for under the former law. 150 Next, the
court may satisfy expenditures by claiming agents and claiming
authorities for the maintenance and operation of real property at-
tached pursuant to article 13-A' 51 and expenditures for ,the dispo-
sal of hazardous substances or other materials when the forfeiture
action is based upon a violation of the environmental conservation
law. 52 The claiming authority may then recover fifteen percent of
the costs and expenses incurred in the investigation, preparation,
and litigation of the forfeiture action, including the proportion of
salaries devoted to those activities.15' In addition, the claiming
agent can recover five percent of the actual costs it incurred for
protecting, maintaining, and forfeiting the property, also including
the proportional percentage of salaries.'
Of any remaining funds, forty percent must be distributed to
the state Substance Abuse Service Fund.15 5 This percentage is
from monies recovered in all cases, and is not limited to funds re-
covered in narcotics-related prosecutions, as was the case under
prior law. Finally, three-quarters of the balance of the remaining
funds must be deposited into a law enforcement account for use in
the investigation of penal law offenses. 56 The remaining twenty-
five percent of the monies must be deposited into a prosecution
services account for use in the prosecution of penal law offenses. 157
If multiple claiming agents participated in the forfeiture action,
the funds must be disbursed to the law enforcement accounts in
accordance with the terms of a written agreement between the re-
spective claiming agents reflecting their participation in the forfei-
ture action. 58
3. Civil Forfeiture
Once a defendant is convicted of an OCCA violation, the de-
fendant and any enterprise he controls may be subjected to equita-
ble remedies, including injunctions to prevent future misconduct.









ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This relief is available not only against the criminal enterprise, but
also against any infiltrated legitimate enterprise. Such is the relief
provided for under CPLR article 13-B.
Drafted and adopted together with OCCA, article 13-B sets
forth civil remedies available to the court following an OCCA con-
viction. Its purpose is to prevent the continuation of criminal con-
duct committed through an enterprise. An action pursuant to arti-
cle 13-B is civil in nature and, like that under article 13-A, is
separate from the criminal action. Unlike an action under article
13-A, however, an article 13-B proceeding may be filed only after a
criminal conviction for the violation of one of the subdivisions of
Penal Law section 460.20.159
The relief available to the prosecutor under article 13-B in-
cludes: (a) an order requiring the defendant to divest himself of his
interest in a specified enterprise; (b) an order imposing "reasona-
ble restrictions" upon the future activities or investments of the
defendant; (c) an order dissolving or reorganizing the enterprise;
(d) an order suspending or revoking a state or local license or per-
mit held by the defendant or any enterprise controlled by the de-
fendant or in whose control he participates; and (e) an order revok-
ing the certificate of incorporation of any corporation in which the
defendant has a controlling interest to conduct business within
New York. 60
D. Case Law under OCCA
As indicated above, there have been only a handful of indict-
ments filed under OCCA. 161 These indictments, however, have
19 See id. 1310(6), 1311(1)(b). Article 13-A permits preconviction forfeiture in certain
circumstances prior to or in the absence of any criminal proceeding. Id. Preconviction ac-
tions are only applicable where the underlying felony involves narcotics or marijuana. The
prosecutor may prove the occurrence of such a criminal act, not necessarily by the 13-A
defendant, in the forfeiture case itself. Id. The proof of the crime, however, must meet the
higher civil standard of clear and convincing evidence. Id. 1311(3)(b)(i). All other elements
of the forfeiture action require a preponderance standard of proof. Id. 1311(3)(b)(ii).
160 Similar relief, as provided for under article 13-B, is available under 18 U.S.C. section
1964(a) of RICO. See, e.g., United States v. United Slate Tile, 871 F.2d 401, 407-08 (3d Cir.
1989) (court decree enjoining union leaders from holding office or participating in union
affairs); United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1987) (receivership pendente
lite over restaurant allegedly used by organized crime for cash skimming); United States v.
Local 560, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 295 (3d Cir. 1985) (trusteeship
imposed on Teamsters local dominated by organized crime), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986).
"I See notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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failed to generate any reported case law. Only issues relating to
OCCA's elaborate and extensive provisions regarding the issue of
double jeopardy have been decided.'62 Codified in article 40 of the
Criminal Procedure Law and adopted in 1986 as part of OCCA,
these provisions attempt to explain when double jeopardy would
apply to a state prosecution for enterprise corruption.16 3
CONCLUSION
OCCA reflects the New York State Legislature's attempt to
formulate workable components of an effective law, drawing from
RICO and comparable statutes. The overall effort is commendable.
OCCA has a substantially more limited scope than its federal
counterpart and clearly grants greater protection to defendants
and innocent third parties than does RICO. Furthermore, its pro-
cedural mechanisms, though somewhat cumbersome, reflect the
careful drafting and attention to detail which is typically lacking
from RICO-type statutes. Yet, Baby RICO is still an infant, with
its provisions remaining to be probed. Despite precision drafting,
state prosecutors perhaps have taken the statute's narrow scope
too much to heart. Only a handful of indictments have been filed
under OCCA and those have failed to generate any case law of
substance.
Without prosecution and judicial interpretation, the lofty po-
tential of OCCA will remain unfulfilled and its strength against or-
ganized crime will go untested. Until it develops a solid body of
decisional law, Baby RICO will fail to meet the purpose of its crea-
tion. Let us hope that the legislature's child will mature and grow
strong and, learning from its ancestors, meet our expectations as a
capable, responsible, and a respected force in the fight against
crime.
102 See N.Y. CRIB. PROC. LAW § 40.50 (McKinney Pam. 1991); People v. Bokum, 145
Misc. 2d 860, 867-69, 548 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608-10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989); People v.
Cooper, 143 Misc. 2d 654, 655-56, 541 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989).
"' These provisions and the cases addressing them are outside the scope of this Article.
For an in-depth discussion of these provisions and related issues, see N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW
§ 40.50 commentaries at 168-71 (McKinney Pam. 1991).

